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 Multiple scholars have invested a substantial amount of time analyzing the origins of our 
government. The records of the Constitutional Convention along with the history of the State 
Ratifying Conventions remain popular topics among historians and political scientists because of 
the role that the outcomes of these events play in the United States today. Although there have 
been amendments added over time, we continue to follow the foundation laid out in the 
Constitution over 200 years ago. Understanding what drove the final decisions made within the 
Constitutional Convention and why the founders compromised on certain aspects of the 
Constitution, gives us a better understanding of why we continue to follow the rules today, and 
whether or not we still should. However, there currently remains disagreement among scholars 
over the motivation behind decisions made during both the Constitutional Convention and the 
State Ratifying Conventions. Some scholars argue that the Constitution was the final result of 
thoughtful deliberation in which reason and principle prevailed. They believe that the founders 
held a common understanding of the ideal republican society and therefore every decision they 
made was a result of persuasion over which solutions would best protect this common ideal. 
Other scholars suggest that reason had little to do with the Convention and both individual and 
state interests drove the decisions that were made. Some scholars have entered the conversation 
in an attempt to bridge this gap between interests and reason, and to some extent this essay will 
endorse those views. However, this essay also provides new insight into the discourse on this 
subject.  
 What truly motivated the decisions that led to the Constitution today? Based on the 
current scholarly discourse as well as the records of the Constitutional Convention and the State 
Ratifying Conventions, the answer is somewhat complex. Both interests and reason played a 




and principle, not separate from them, and this was and is a necessary relationship. Hopefully, by 
understanding the connection and relationship between interests and reason, the role that 
interests played might be viewed in a new and less negative light, and might help us better 
understand the implications this has on the political decisions we make today.   
 Again, multiple historians, including Gordon Wood, Isaak Kramnick, and Frank Harmon 
Garver, to some extent endorse the idea that the Constitution was the final result of thoughtful 
deliberation in which reason and principle prevailed.1 Gordon Wood provides an argument that 
both endorses this interpretation as well as grounds us in what we mean by reason and principle 
in the context of this time period. For example, Wood argues that the founders all wanted to 
achieve an ideal republican society, which, according to the founders, centers around “[t]he 
sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole.”2 In fact, Wood points out, 
Thomas Paine said, “[t]he word republic means the public good, or the good of the whole, in 
contradistinction to the despotic form, which makes the good of the sovereign, or of one man, the 
only object of government.”3 Further, Wood argues, Thomas Paine also distinguished a republic 
from a despotic form of government, which reflects the fact that the founders had just fought 
against the King of Great Britain and an aristocratic class that disregarded the needs of the 
colonists.4 The attention paid toward a common good “expresse[s] the colonists’ deepest hatreds 
of the old order and their most visionary hopes for the new.”5 Thus, as a reaction against a small 
ruling class acting in their own interests, the founders agreed that their new republic should 
protect the interests of the entire society or the common good.  
 However, Wood also argues that it was not just their experience with Great Britain that 




Roman Republics. Understanding what made these republics great as well as what led to their 
demise was vital to the founders because, as Jonathan Austin argued in 1778,  
Similar causes will forever operate like effects in the political, moral, and physical 
world: those vices which ruined illustrious republics of Greece, and the mighty 
commonwealth of Rome, and which are now ruining Great Britain…must 
eventually overturn every state, where their deleterious influence is suffered to 
prevail.6  
 
 In other words, the same forces that acted on ancient republics would act on the new republic 
they were trying to form and therefore it was vital to understand both what made the republics 
great and what led to their demise in order to protect against the negative forces. Through their 
studies the founders argued that luxury, selfishness, and the desire to improve one’s individual 
life without regard to others is what corrupted and ruined ancient republican societies.7 As a 
result, the new republic would need to protect against these vices. In creating such a republic, the 
founders desired the attributes of the ancient republics that made them strong. For example, they 
desired “the kind of society, like that of Ancient Rome, where the people ‘instructed from early 
infancy to deem themselves the property of the State…were ever ready to sacrifice their concerns 
to her interests.’”8 While the selfishness of individuals ultimately prevailed and led to the 
downfall of these ancient republics, the sacrifice of individual interests to that of the entire 
society is what had made them strong for so many years. Since the founders wanted to create a 
republic that captured this quality, they agreed that the new republic needed to center around 
protecting the common good. Thus, when discussing whether or not the founders used reason 
during the Constitutional Convention, we mean they argued the details of the government that 
would best uphold republican principles, such as protecting the common good. 
 Similar to Gordon Wood, Isaak Kramnick discusses the Convention in terms of the 




Convention was a “paradigm battle” in which multiple ideologies were endorsed by different 
delegates and the debates consisted of these delegates trying to reason with each other on why 
their ideology was best.9 While Kramnick, and even Wood, argue that between the time of the 
Revolutionary War and the Constitutional Convention, private interest was a competing theory, 
they both come to the final conclusion that protecting the public good remained the core value of 
the founders.10 For example, Kramnick argues that while private interest was a rising theory, the 
goals behind private interest still focused on serving the common good.11 There was simply a 
change in emphasis on 
the nature of public behavior. The moral and virtuous man was no longer defined 
by his economic activity. One’s duty was still to contribute to the public good, but 
this was best done through economic activity, which actually aimed at private 
gain.12  
 
In other words, while there was debate among the founders over the means, the ultimate goal was 
still to protect the common good. The new interest in private accomplishment really benefited 
the whole community because, the argument goes, if you are successful economically, you will 
therefore boost the entire economy, whereas vice versa, if you are not individually successful, 
then you will become a drag on the economy. Kramnick does go on to discuss other ideologies 
that made their way into the Convention debates in some way or another. However, he argues 
that there was no true “victor” in what he defines as the paradigm battle.13 In fact, he believes the 
languages of republicanism, liberalism, the Protestant ethic, and ideals of sovereignty and power 
were all present in the debate over our new Constitution.14 However, even more important to our 
discussion is that no matter which theory or ideal they endorsed at any particular time, they all 
seemed to have the common good in mind in one way or another. Further, they were all, in fact, 
using their reason to argue what form of government would best protect that common good and 




endorses the view that the founders used reason and principle to make decisions during the 
Constitutional Convention. 
 Other scholars go even further to suggest that not only were certain ideologies and 
principles at the core of debate, but that the delegates desired to understand each other and use 
reason to compromise. For example, Frank Harmon Garver argued that “[t]he give and take of 
debate, modified by a willingness to be convinced, a disposition to compromise, and a 
determination to succeed produced a situation favorable to careful deliberation,”15 and “[w]hen 
such men as these acknowledged changes in their opinions, it shows that better arguments were 
winning over those not so good...”16  Thus, Garver argues that the Convention was a deliberative 
assembly of highly esteemed individuals who entered with the intention of understanding one 
another and using reason and judgment to make compromises. He further suggests that the very 
idea of debate, in which those on each side had ample chance to explain their points of view, 
persuaded certain delegates to change their minds, and this ‘meeting of the minds’ is what led to 
the result of certain compromises during the Convention. At the end of the day, the more 
persuasive and reasonable arguments are the ones that won because they better persuaded the 
delegates.17  
 However, other scholars, including both historians, such as Peter B. Knupfer, George 
William Van Cleve, Gordon Lloyd and Christopher Burkett, and political scientists, such as 
Jeremy C. Pope and Shawn Treier, have entered the conversation suggesting reason had little to 
do with decisions made during the Convention.18 As Knupfer argues, compromises that were 
made throughout the Convention were not a result of a “meeting of the minds” but instead 
“…arose from necessity and could be accepted only after the Federalists slyly told each group 





Republicanism…prescribe[d] ideal remedies and identif[ied] conspiratorial foes, 
but it was not cohesive enough a doctrine to withstand alone the more demanding 
loyalties of state, section, pocketbook, and fashion a realistic framework of 
government from the apparently incompatible materials at hand.20  
 
In other words, he argues that there were too many competing interests whether it was small 
versus large state interests, the Northern versus the Southern divide, or money and economic 
interests. As a result, when it came to deciding the specifics of the government, competing 
interests are what forced compromise in which promises were made that appealed to both sides, 
but did not necessarily provide the best solution for the ideological principles of republicanism. 
Only with ultimatums did any delegates concede to their convictions, not through persuasive 
deliberation or a “meeting of the minds”.  
 Similarly, George William Van Cleve endorses the interest side of things. He argues,  
[t]he Convention debate about representation was not an abstract debate about 
how to implement republican principles, but was instead, as political scientist 
Mark Graber argues, a debate about political “security arrangements” between 
different sections of the country, whose delegates saw the terms of representation 
as the basis for protecting their conflicting sectional interests.21  
 
He argues that some of the widely debated issues during the Convention, such as taxation and 
representation were really over sectional issues, or slave versus non-slave states, and that 
appealing in some way to those interests is how compromises were made.22  
 Further, both Jurgen Heideking and Pauline Maier endorse the interest side of the debate 
by arguing that interests were the driving force that led to ratification within the states. They 
argue that the most widely debated issues during the State Ratifying Conventions were focused 
on the implications that the Constitution would have on the particular interests of each state. For 
example, Heideking argues	that	in	Connecticut	criticisms	were	“mainly	directed	at	




people in Connecticut cared most about how the Constitution would affect them economically, 
especially when it came to taxes, and how much power they would hold compared to Southern 
states, so as to ensure they would hold enough power to protect their interests.24 To, Maier holds 
the view that the individual concerns of the states were focused on interests such as their 
economies and share of representation within the federal government as compared to other 
states.25 In order to persuade the skeptics who held these types of concerns, Heideking argues 
that the federalists carefully shaped their arguments to demonstrate how “… the new order would 
politically and economically benefit” whichever state they were appealing to at the time. Further, 
the opponents who still remained hard pressed to ratify, only agreed to change their minds with 
the promise that a Bill of Rights would be added.26 This Bill of Rights would address the 
concerns of the states as well as protect the sovereignty of the states so that they could better 
protect their individual interests.27 Furthermore, both Heideking and Maier suggest that states 
voted to ratify only after ensuring that the Constitution appealed to their interests in some way 
and that their interests would have a means of protection via the Bill of Rights. Thus, Maier and 
Heideking endorse the view that interests were the driving force behind the adoption of the 
Constitution rather than reasoning over the protection of republican principles.28 
 In response to these two competing ideas, other scholars have provided new 
interpretations of the Convention that suggest both reason and interests played a role. For 
example, Jack N. Rakove enters the conversation by analyzing the arguments surrounding the 
first few weeks of debate, primarily over the form of representation that would take place in the 
Senate, either proportional to state populations or equal state representation.29 Through his 
analysis, he claims that Madison’s ‘extended republic’ was the central idea debated during the 




and tried to reason for weeks why this would achieve the goals of the republic, both reason and 
interests played a role to counteract Madison’s arguments.31 On the reason side, Rakove argues 
that there were fundamental flaws in Madison’s theory that certain delegates continued to point 
out and reason against.32 In theory, certain ideas made sense, but putting them into practice was 
more complicated. While delegates might have endorsed different solutions, they were still 
trying to achieve a common goal and reason with each other why their solution would best 
achieve that goal. However, Rakove then adds the role that interests played. In fact, he suggests 
that while reason had its place, there were certain interests that small state delegates were 
unwilling to give up. For example, Rakove argues that for some delegates such as Roger 
Sherman and William Paterson, “all the reasoning in the world” could not have altered their 
positions.33 These delegates recognized that small states had different interests from large states 
and they cared more about protecting the interests of their states than trying to devise a plan that 
would benefit the common good or interests of all states.34 Thus, Rakove concludes that the 
debates were not so cut and dry. Sometimes reason was used, but other times interests prevailed. 
There was a complex interplay between interests and reason and both had their fair share of 
influence. 
 Peter Onuf and Cathy Matson take a somewhat similar interpretation as Rakove. They 
argue that the founders were realistic in their goals, and therefore had to balance their deep-
rooted republican principles with the interests of both individuals and states.35 They argue that 
federalists held deep convictions about an ideal republican society, but they also recognized the 
increasing sectional divide and how self-interest was destroying the Confederation.36 However, 
because of this self-interest, the founders had to be thoughtful in creating a Constitution that 




government.37 Thus, they ultimately argue that interests were not an evil that dominated the 
Convention, but that part of creating a National government that protects the common good 
(principle), the founders had to also create a government that in some way protected the interests 
of the states, and therefore finding common ground or common interests was part of and not 
separate from designing a Constitution grounded in republican principles and reason. 
  For the most part, the current conversation has continued to move beyond a black and 
white debate over reason and interest and endorsed an interpretation more closely resembling 
that of Rakove or Matson and Onuf. This essay will somewhat resemble Matson and Onuf’s 
interpretation. In part one, this essay will analyze the debates over The Great Compromise of 
1787, to show how both reason and interests played a role in the rhetoric at the Constitutional 
Convention. In part two, this essay will analyze the main issues present during the ratification 
debates. Through this analysis, it should become clear that interests were ultimately rooted in 
reason and principle, not separate from them, and that this was a necessary relationship. 
However, my essay will answer this question under different circumstances. To be clear, there is 
a distinction between the rhetoric during the Constitutional Convention and the rhetoric during 
the Ratifying Conventions that has not been fully realized. In an attempt to understand what truly 
motivated the decisions that led to our Constitution, my essay will look at the difference between 
the ways the delegates looked at and questioned the document and the ways the public looked at 
and questioned the document. This will provide a deeper understanding of how and why our 
Constitution became what it is today. 
 Without question, appealing to reason to defend certain republican principles dominated 
the first six weeks of debate within the Constitutional Convention. These first six weeks of 




delegates, specifically those from the smaller states, argued that the representatives in the first 
branch of the legislature should be apportioned based on the population size of each state, while 
in the second branch each state should be given equal representatives. Other delegates, those 
from the larger states, felt that both the first and second branches of the legislature should be 
apportioned based on population size. In the end, this debate culminated in what came to be 
known as the Great Compromise of 1787, in which equal representation in the second branch 
prevailed. The arguments made by both sides suggest that republican principles remained at the 
center of debate, and the delegates attempted to use reason to persuade their fellow delegates. 
 As Gordon Wood argued, one of the leading republican principles that the founders 
wanted to protect was the common good. Based on their arguments over the best form of 
representation in the Senate, their desire to protect this republican principle becomes evident. For 
example, one of the fears of those in favor of equal representation in the second branch was that 
the large states would create a majority faction if the number of representatives were based on 
the population size in both branches of the legislature and therefore no longer act in the interests 
of the collective good. A faction, as Madison defines it, is “a number of citizens, whether 
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community.”38 Again, the founders wanted a republic that protects the 
good of the whole, so if a majority faction exists, then that faction will pursue interests that are 
adverse to the interests of the entire community, and therefore the republic will no longer protect 
the good of the whole. Thus, the delegates from smaller states argued that proportional 
representation in both branches would lead to this majority faction with no means of protecting 




 For example, Judge Ellsworth argued that if the first branch of legislature was 
apportioned based on population,  
[t]he large States…[would] have an influence that would maintain their 
superiority… …[there would be] danger of combinations among the large States 
[and] [t]hey [would] like individuals find out and avail themselves of the 
advantage to be gained by it. Holland, as had been admitted (by Mr. {Madison}) 
had, notwithstanding a like equality in the Dutch Confederacy, a prevailing 
influence in the public measures.39  
 
Ellsworth argued that the larger states, by the mere fact that they are large, will naturally have 
similar interests and will therefore group together to ensure their interests are met. Just as people 
recognize the advantage of grouping up with other people who have similar interests, states also 
recognize that advantage. In doing so, the interests of the large states will always prevail in the 
first branch because the large states maintain a majority of the representatives. As a result, the 
interests of the small states would never have any weight, and the large states would always 
maintain that ‘superiority’. He demonstrates the danger of this superiority by pointing out that 
Holland, which had maintained ‘prevailing influence’ because of its power as a majority, 
contributed to the failure of the Dutch Confederacy. Therefore, since the large states would 
group together based on a common interest that is adverse to the rights or interests of the small 
states, the first branch of the legislature would no longer protect the good of the whole and would 
endanger the success of the republic. 
 In order to protect against the dangers of a majority faction that would inevitably form in 
the first branch of the legislature, the second branch must, Ellsworth argued, give equal 
representation to the states. Equal representation would give “[t]he power of self-defence…to the 
small States.”40 For example, Ellsworth went on to explain,  
[i]f the larger states seek security, they will have it fully in the first branch of the 
general government. But can we turn the tables and say that the lesser states are 




states must possess the power of self-defence or be ruined. Will anyone say there 
is no diversity of interests in the states? And if there is, should not those interests 
be guarded and secured?41  
 
Again, since the large states will likely form a majority faction in the first branch, their interests 
are secure. However, the interests of the small states, which are different from those of the large 
states, have no means to secure their interests. Thus, it is necessary for the second branch of the 
legislature to give equal representation to the states in order to give the small states a mechanism 
for defense against the larger ones. In turn, the balance between the first and second branches of 
legislature would protect the common good, by protecting the interests of both large and small 
states and therefore protecting the good of the whole. 
 In response to these arguments, Madison explained that a republic extended over a large 
area would make forming factions almost impossible and would therefore prevent a majority 
faction from forming in the legislature, protecting both minority interests and the common good.  
For example, Madison emphasized this idea when Mr. Sherman, although in favor of equal 
representation, conceded that “states may indeed be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby be too 
subject to faction.” Going off this concession and in defense for proportional representation, 
Madison argued,  
[i]n a Republican Govt.  the Majority if united have always an opportunity. The 
only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into so 
great a number of interests & parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be 
likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the 
whole or of the minority; and in the 2nd. Place, that in case they shd. Have such an 
interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it.42  
 
Madison and Mr. Sherman both agreed that in a republican government, the majority will always 
maintain power but only if they are united in a faction. Since the republic they are forming, 
unlike the Dutch Republic that Ellsworth used as an example, is in fact extended over a large 




government legislates creates so numerous a number of diverse interests that there is unlikely to 
even be a majority interest. If there somehow is a majority interest, it is unlikely that those with 
the same interest will have the means to unite since they are so geographically distant from each 
other. Even further, because the sphere is extended and there are so many diverse interests, the 
legislature, if based on population, will better reflect the good of the whole, by reflecting the 
numerous diverse interests of the people rather than any majority or minority interest. Thus, 
Madison made the case that equal representation is not needed to protect against a majority 
faction and representation based on population better reflects the interests of the whole. While 
the delegates went back and forth on this issue for weeks, some endorsing Ellsworth’s view and 
some endorsing Madison’s view, the rhetoric over this particular issue suggests that the founders 
cared about and focused their energy on defending the republican principle of protecting the 
common good. They attempted to reason with each other and agree on which form would best 
protect the republic. 
 Further, as the weeks went on, other arguments over the Senate continued to reflect the 
founders’ desires to protect the common good. However, determining what constituted the 
common good muddied the waters. For example, Mr. L Martin argued, “I am willing to give up 
private interest for the public good…” Here, he agrees that protecting the common good was 
important to the new republic. Then he went on to say, “…but I must be satisfied first, that it is 
the public interest-and who can decide this point? A majority only of the union.”43 While he 
agreed that the common good, or public good, mattered, he disagreed over what constituted this 
public good. Delegates from the large states argued that protecting the common good meant that 
the majority of individuals made decisions, as in proportional representation. What Martin, and 




union, meaning decisions should be made by the majority of states. He argued that “the Genral 
Govt. was meant merely to preserve the State Governts: not to govern individuals…that 
individuals as such have little to do but with their own States…”44 In other words, he endorsed 
the idea that states are sovereign and a national government is meant to preserve that 
sovereignty, not to infringe on state power to govern the individuals within those states. Thus, 
protecting the common good meant protecting the good of all states not all individuals.  
 In order to defend his argument and derive the right to state sovereignty and the equality 
of states, Mr. Martin went on to explain, 
[t]he first principle of government is founded on the natural rights of individuals 
and in perfect equality….This principle of equality, when applied to individuals, 
is lost in some degree, when he becomes a member of society, to which it is 
transferred; and this society, by name of state or kingdom, is, with respect to 
others, again on a perfect footing of equality-a right to govern themselves as they 
please. Nor can any other state, of right, deprive them of this equality.  If such a 
state confederates, it is intended for the good of the whole [and] those rights must 
be well guarded. Nor can any state demand a surrender of any of those rights; if it 
can, equality is already destroyed.45  
 
Here Martin claims that in a state of nature, individuals have perfect equality, but when they 
enter into a society, they transfer some power to that society and therefore relinquish some of 
those rights. This society, is then in a new ‘state of nature’ in comparison to other states and 
should be in perfect equality to those other states. Thus, each state has a natural claim to 
sovereignty. If a state chooses to confederate, they do so for the good of the whole, but, unlike 
the people entering into a society, the states are still on equal footing with each other and should 
not lose their equality. Further, he argues, “laws made by one man or a set of men, and not by 
common consent, is slavery-and it is so when applied to states, if you give them unequal 
representation.”46 Thus, Martin is arguing that in order to preserve the equality and sovereignty 




is necessary. Then, once that is successfully established, the common good of all states is 
protected because decisions will be made by a majority of states on equal footing with each 
other. 
 In direct response to this, federalist David Ramsay points out the flaws in Martin’s 
argument,  
[w]hen several parishes, counties, or districts, form a state, the separate interests 
of each must yield to the collective interest of the whole. When several states 
combine in one government, the same principles must be observed. These 
relinquishments of natural rights, are not real sacrifices: each person, county, or 
state, gains more than it loses, for it only gives up a right of injuring others, and 
obtains in return aid and strength to secure itself in the peaceable enjoyment of all 
remaining rights.47  
 
Ramsay is arguing that just like individuals give up natural rights when they enter a society, as 
Martin argued, counties and districts give up rights when they become a collective part of a state, 
and so too should states give up rights when they enter into a national federation. Further, giving 
up these rights would better protect the good of the whole because otherwise each individual 
state would act selfishly and disregard the rights and interests of the other states. For example, 
Peter Onuf details Noah Webster’s argument that the Articles of Confederation failed because 
…the states had…betrayed republican principles by refusing to acknowledge one 
another’s rights and by selfishly promoting their interests at one another’s 
expense…Under these conditions, [Noah Webster] concluded, ‘our boasted state 
sovereignties are so far from securing our liberty and property, that they, every 
moment, expose us to the loss of both.’48  
 
Thus, he argues that when states retain their sovereignty, they act in their own interests to such a 
degree that they disregarded the interests of the other states and therefore infringe upon the 
interests and rights of the whole of society, or the common good. Therefore, proportional 
representation better protects the common good by representing the people rather than the 




arguments made by both sides demonstrate the delegates’ focus on reasoning with each other 
over which form of representation would best protect the common good. 
  Without getting too bogged down in the details and trying to determine the most 
compelling arguments, we are most concerned with what these arguments tell us about the 
rhetoric within the Convention. Both sides tried to persuade their fellow delegates by using 
reason to suggest that their way would best protect the common good. They spent weeks 
discussing how to prevent factions from forming so that neither majority nor minority rule would 
dominate the legislature and the interests of the whole would be represented. They also used 
historical example to try and reason with each other over the role of states within a national 
government and why that mattered to protecting the common good. Based on these arguments 
and the length of debates over these issues, appealing to reason and principle clearly had its place 
in the debates at the Constitutional Convention, and dominated the floor within the first six 
weeks. 
 However, while republican principles remained important to the delegates, these six 
weeks of reasoning with each other failed to accomplish any kind of compromise. As a result, the 
founders began appealing to interests as a way to end the standstill and move deliberations 
forward. In order to understand the role that interests played, we must analyze the final vote that 
became the Great Compromise. The initial vote for equal representation actually failed on June 
11th and only narrowly passed on July 16th by a vote of 5-4-1 suggesting the founders barely 
came to a compromise.49 In fact, the bill only passed because North Carolina switched sides and 
Massachusetts became divided; all other states voted the same way both times.50 Thus, 
determining why North Carolina switched sides will help determine why equal representation 




 As Jeremy Pope and Shawn Treier argue, there are “[l]ogically [only] two possible causes 
for any shift in a state’s position: moderation of a state delegation’s position on the issue, or the 
structure of the agenda.”51 In other words, the delegates were either persuaded by the arguments 
made and therefore changed their positions, or there was a change in the agenda when they voted 
the final time that offered them a benefit in return for a change in their positions. Pope and Treier 
argue the latter, specifically suggesting that the role of slavery or the Three-Fifths Compromise 
was crucial to North Carolina’s change in position.52 
 First they argue, “the votes on June 11 and July 16 were not really the same, because the 
intervening agenda structure had altered the content of the convention proposals and 
agreements.”53 To better understand how this might be the case, it is important to note that, 
[t]he Great Compromise was not simply a clean vote on representation. 
When GC [was] proposed, it include[d] a number of items, including 
slavery and the Three-Fifths Compromise, the manner of the census, and 
the ability of the national legislature to regulate the rule of representation 
in the future.54  
 
Thus, in order to analyze the effect of this agenda on the final outcome, Pope and Treier looked 
at each extra item on the agenda to determine the effect it had on North Carolina. Ultimately, 
they determined that the Three-Fifths Compromise is what swayed the delegates’ vote.55 Other 
scholars, such as Rakove also agree that the issue over slavery was vital during the Constitutional 
Convention.56 However, Rakove argued that the question over slavery that led to the Three-
Fifths Compromise was separate from the Great Compromise.57 Unlike Rakove and others, Pope 
and Treier suggest that the role of slavery was actually the deciding factor. 
 In order to break down the agenda and prove their argument, Pope and Treier first 
analyze the votes on the census and taxation clause.58 They found that Mr. Gerry proposed an 




taxation would be a matter that included the state-level representatives as well as the national 
representatives and would begin based on the rule of representation then being established-a rule 
that included the thee-fifths clause.”60 The amendment may have been about taxation, but it also 
guaranteed the Three-Fifths Compromise. Prior to this amendment, North Carolina voted nay, 
but following this new piece to the agenda, North Carolina switched its position. Since North 
Carolina was a large slave state, the guarantee of the Three-Fifths Compromise would bolster 
their influence in the first branch of the legislature such that they would have more 
representation even compared to other large states. Thus, this suggests that the guarantee of the 
Three-Fifths Compromise is ultimately what changed North Carolina’s position. 
 Looking at the records of the Constitutional Convention, the evidence suggests Pope and 
Treier are correct. The founders openly admitted that slavery played a role in swaying North 
Carolina’s vote. For example, during the Constitutional Convention, 
Mr. Davie, said it was high time now to speak out. He saw that it was meant by 
some gentlemen to deprive the Southern States of any share of Representation for 
their blacks. He was sure that N. Carolina would never confederate on any terms 
that did not rate them at least as 3/5. If the Eastern States meant to exclude them 
altogether the business was at an end.”61  
 
Mr. Davie admitted that if North Carolina was not ensured representation for its’ slaves, the vote 
would never pass. Thus, he concluded that some form of representation for the slaves, such as 
was manifested in the Three-Fifths Compromise, would have to be guaranteed for North 
Carolina to change sides and vote for equal representation.  
 While the founders tried to persuade each other using reason that appealed to republican 
principles, they spent six weeks with neither side budging. As a result, the change in the agenda, 
which added the Three-Fifths clause that bolstered the representative power of slave states in the 




slave states, North Carolina switched sides, suggesting that interests were used as a necessary 
mechanism to find a solution and move deliberations forward to other important issues. 
 However, bringing the argument full circle, interests were not actually separate from 
reason and principle. Yes, interests ultimately led to the final decision in this case, but these 
interests were rooted in principles. Without the Three-Fifths clause, the Southern slave states 
argued that the Northern wealth would be accounted for and the Southern wealth would not, 
therefore creating unfair representation, and giving disproportionate advantage to the Northern 
free states. In turn, this form of representation would not protect the good of the whole 
community, and instead give advantage to the good of only part of the community. 
 As Van Cleve argues, “many Northern [and Southern] delegates accepted the principle 
that wealth should be represented in a republican government.”62 The founders, again using 
republican principle as the foundation for their arguments, believed wealth should be represented 
because wealth directly related to how much a state contributed to the good of the whole. In fact, 
Mr. Rutledge made this exact argument during the Convention. He argued that a state must be 
able to produce for the country in proportion to its representation. Alternatively, since the 
national government would lay direct taxes on the states,63essentially valuing each state’s 
contribution, and since the wealth of the Southern slave states, the slaves, would be accounted 
for in this tax, so too should the wealth from the slaves be accounted for in representation.  
 Further,  
Northern delegates also generally agreed that, as Rufus King said, the Southern 
states were comparatively wealthier, and that the three-fifths clause appropriately 





Gaining Northern support mattered because while the delegates agreed that wealth should be 
accounted for, the Southern delegates still had to convince the Northern delegates that the slaves 
significantly impacted the wealth of the Southern states. In order to do so, Mr. Mason argued,  
[i]t was certain that the slaves were valuable, as they raised the value of land, 
increased the exports & imports, and of course the revenue, would supply the 
means of feeding & supporting an army, and might in cases of emergency become 
themselves soldiers. As in these important respects they were useful to the 
community at large, they ought not to be excluded from the estimate of 
Representation.65 
 
In the end, the delegates ultimately agreed with Mr. Mason and agreed that slaves did make up a 
significant part of Southern wealth that needed to be represented in some way. 
 Thus, as Van Cleve points out, with equal representation in the Senate, and without the 
Three-Fifths Compromise, “apportionment that relied solely on free inhabitant population would 
nominally have excluded a major part of the wealth of Southern slave states, while including all 
of Northern wealth.”66 The Northern wealth would be accounted for because, 
The North’s free population was a reasonably good surrogate for Northern wealth 
(as both sides had conceded during earlier taxation debates and northern delegates 
reaffirmed at the Convention), while the South’s free population was 
comparatively poorly correlated with total southern wealth because so much of 
southern wealth consisted of slaves (and related land values).67   
 
Since this was generally agreed upon after some debate, the Three-Fifths clause made its way 
into the vote on representation.  
 Based on these arguments, it becomes clearer as to the motive behind the Three-Fifths 
Compromise. Yes, this clause appealed to the interests of the Southern slave states and was the 
turning point in the vote on representation. However, the interest of slavery was rooted in 
republican principles. It is hard to discuss slavery without casting a negative light because our 
understanding of slavery today is much different than it was in 1787. If we can cast our view 




understand how their arguments are grounded in republican principles. The delegates spent 
considerable time debating the Three-Fifths clause and why it would make sense in order to best 
represent all states fairly. In doing so, they came to the conclusion that the Three-Fifths clause 
was necessary to account for the wealth of the Southern slave states, which would otherwise be 
inaccurately accounted for in comparison to the Northern free states. So, to best protect the 
interests and good of the whole (both Northern and Southern states), the Three-Fifths clause 
provided the best solution.  
 Therefore, while the founders agreed on the ideological understanding of a republic, the 
details of setting up the government in such a way that protected these republican ideals proved 
much more complicated. Reasoning over abstract principles was most definitely used during the 
Convention but with little success of compromise. As a result, the delegates had to turn away 
from these abstract arguments and instead turn toward interests to finally compromise and move 
deliberations forward. However, interests were not separate from the principles that the founders 
adhered to. In fact, these interests were backed by principles and balancing interests was a way to 
ensure the national government would protect the good of the whole, or the interests of all states.  
 Unlike the Constitutional Convention itself, however, once the delegates sent a draft out 
to the states, the rhetoric surrounding the ratification debates did seem to focus heavily on more 
selfish interests, making it a challenge to see any connection to republican principles. For 
example, as Pauline Maier argues, Delaware and New Jersey ratified the Constitution quickly 
and with little discussion or opposition because the Constitution appealed to their specific 
interests.68 In fact, Delaware ratified the Constitution unanimously with only four days of 
discussion.69 This was surprising not only because of the speed and unanimity more generally, 




For such a deeply divided state, the Constitution must have offered Delaware enough to convince 
both parties to so readily agree without debate.  Maier provides one explanation, which is backed 
by evidence. She argues that, “[o]nce the Constitution went into effect, Delaware would no 
longer have to pay the duties Pennsylvania levied on goods imported through Philadelphia and 
sold to people in Delaware,” among other provisions that would help Delaware economically by 
reducing its tax burden.71 Further, due to the Great Compromise, Delaware would gain power via 
the Senate that it lacked under the Articles of Confederation.72 Based on the evidence, Maier’s 
argument is, in fact, substantiated and there is proof that these interests were particularly 
important to Delaware and critical to its unanimous decision. Delaware had recently split from 
Pennsylvania and being both a small state and only recently independent, held little power.73 As 
a result, delegates from Delaware had fought for equal representation in the Senate during the 
Constitutional Convention and even threatened to leave the Convention if proportional 
representation was adopted.74 Thus demonstrating Delaware’s deep desire for more power and 
how well the final result played to its interests. Also, Delaware had already been levying for an 
increase in the power of Congress under the Articles of Confederation to better regulate trade 
and import taxes between states with the hope of ending its reliance on Pennsylvania.75 Again, 
this demonstrates that the Constitution provided direct solutions to the issues that Delaware was 
most concerned with. Thus, it makes sense that Delaware would so quickly and unanimously 
ratify a Constitution that appealed to its greatest interests. 
 Similarly, New Jersey was a divided state politically, yet voted to ratify the Constitution 
unanimously and quickly.76 New Jersey, like Delaware, was paying duties levied on goods 
imported through Philadelphia and New York, and desired more power and less reliance on those 




advocated for even before the Constitutional Convention.78 Thus, it is no surprise that New 
Jersey also ratified a Constitution that appealed to its specific interests.  
  Based on the evidence, it is clear that the states that ratified quickly did so 
because the Constitution appealed to their interests. To, the states with considerable opposition 
and lengthy debates provide evidence that the rhetoric surrounding ratification centered on 
interests. For example, it is no surprise that Virginia was not one of the states to immediately 
ratify the Constitution. Since the Great Compromise ultimately played to the favor of the small 
states in the North, despite the concessions on slavery, Virginians paid particular attention to the 
ramifications that certain provisions would have on the power dynamic between the Northern 
and Southern divide. One key issue discussed during the Virginia Convention had to do with 
access to the Mississippi River. Free navigation of this river was vital to Virginia’s economy.79 
However, access to this river had already been limited in the past and frequently fought over 
through treaties with Great Britain and Spain.80 Further, one Virginian, William Grayson, argued 
that, 
If the Mississippi was yielded to Spain, the migration to the Western country 
would be stopped, and the Northern States would, not only retain their 
inhabitants, but preserve their superiority and influence over that of the Southern. 
If matters go on in their present direction, there will be a number of new States to 
the Westward-Population may become greater in the Southern scale….This they 
[Northern States] must naturally wish to prevent.81  
 
Further, he argued,  
[t]here are but feeble restrictions at present to prevent” the Northern States from 
relinquishing that river because “the President with two thirds of the members 
present in the Senate, can make any treaty,” and “[t]en members are two thirds of 
a quorum. Ten members are the Representatives of five States. The Northern 
States may then easily make a treaty relinquishing this river.82  
 
Clearly, the Virginians recognized that Northern and Southern states had different interests. 




representation in the Senate, but it would provide a means for Northern states to amass even 
greater power compared to the Southern states in the future and would specifically hinder the 
economic growth of Virginia.83 Again, this further suggests that interests were at the center of 
debate during the Ratifying Conventions. 
 Further evidence that demonstrates the concern that Virginians, among other states, had 
with protecting their interests comes from the exhaustive discussions and insistence on a Bill of 
Rights. As Maier and Heideking both argue, a majority of the discussion during the Virginia 
Convention was centered on the addition of amendments to the Constitution that would protect 
the sovereignty of the states.84 In fact, in their draft of amendments they wanted added, the first 
one read, “[t]hat each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdiction and 
right, which is not by this Constitution delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the 
department of the Federal Government.”85 This is specifically designed to preserve the 
sovereignty of the states by explicitly delegating powers to the states. Further, they proposed 
multiple amendments intended to create a more transparent Congress, such as requiring 
immediate informing of the Executive power of each state if they decide to lay direct taxes or 
excises, requiring journals of the proceedings of the House and Senate to be published, and 
requiring receipts and expenditures of public money to be published.86 The purpose of requiring 
this level of transparency was to keep the states so well informed that Congress would be less 
likely to act directly adverse to the interests of any particular state.87 They even proposed 
multiple amendments that would place restrictions on signing treaties that cede, contract, 
restrain, or suspend territorial rights of the United States including rivers in an attempt to prevent 
their concerns over the Mississippi River.88 Again, these proposed amendments served to 




interests by preserving the sovereignty of their state. Further, these would allow them to maintain 
more control to make decisions that benefit their state and better prevent other states, and the 
Northern states in particular, from harnessing too much power over them. These concerns 
demonstrate Virginia’s desire to protect its own interests. Plus, Virginia was not the only state to 
propose these types of amendments. A total of eight states sent out a list of proposed 
amendments and required that there be a promise of a Bill of Rights or else they would not ratify 
the Constitution.89 Thus, the “nearly universal” insistence on a Bill of Rights that would address 
particular interests of the states, and the degree to which the proposed amendments dominated 
discussions, further demonstrates that the rhetoric during the Ratifying Conventions centered on 
state interests. 
 However, while states were most concerned with their own interests, this 
selfishness should not be viewed in such a negative light. Again, interests are part of and 
not separate from republican principles and reason. For example, when Virginians 
recognized the potential for the Mississippi River to be cut off, they knew that this would 
dramatically impact their economy and future economic growth. By adding the amendment 
about treaties that would protect their interest in the Mississippi River, they were not just 
protecting a selfish interest, but were actually protecting the common good of their state. 
Similarly, as each state analyzed the Constitution, they were most concerned with how it 
would benefit or hurt the good of their state. Concerns over state interests are not separate 
from republican principles. By protecting state interests such as ensuring economic 
growth, representative power, and sovereignty, the states were attempting to do what was 
best for the citizens of their states, or in other words, protect the common good within 




 Yet, the problem here is that while the states were looking after the common 
good within their own states, there was no one looking out for the common good of the 
Confederation as a whole. While the common good of the individual states and the national 
common good both demonstrate attention toward republican principles, they are not 
synonymous. As the founders argued during the Constitutional Convention, since the states 
focused only on their own interests, they were harming the Confederation by acting adverse to 
the interests of other states and therefore the Confederation as a whole.90  
  Further, the founders saw a need to protect the national common good when it came to 
their relations with foreign polities. Again, since each state cared more about its own interests, 
and since the Congress held little power under the Articles of Confederation, the United States 
remained weak when it came to foreign relations and therefore was unable to protect the national 
common good in the international realm.  As Leonard J. Sadosky argues, 
[t]he	 inability	 of	 the	 Confederation	 to	 engage	 with	 polities	 external	 to	 it,	
either	in	North	America	or	in	Europe,	in	a	meaningful,	orderly,	and	sustained	
fashion	was	one	of	 the	most	potent	arguments	 in	 favor	of	 first	 revising	 the	













































ratification.	Georgia ratified unanimously after only one day, but had previously shown 
resistance to any kind of federal system.100 The most likely explanation is that Georgia was a 
weak state with considerable threat of attack by the Creek Indians and needed the type of federal 
protection of its borders, and adoption of more sound treaties that would come with the 
Constitution.101 In fact, a Georgian merchant named Joseph Clay wrote a letter in which he 
admitted that, “[t]he new plan of government for the Union I think will be adopted with us 
readily; the powers are great, but of two evils we must choose the least. Under such a 
government we should have avoided this great evil, an Indian War.”102 This suggests that despite 
Georgia’s resistance to a federal government with too much power, it needed the safety and 
protection that a federal government would provide. A federal system was the lesser of the two 
evils. Therefore, Georgia, to some extent, understood the need for a strong national government 
that could protect the national common good, such as protecting borders and handling 
international relations with a stronger front. 
	 However, the individual interests of the states did not always align perfectly with 
concerns in the national or international sphere. While the states might have seen a need for 
some sort of stronger national government when it came to international relations, they remained 
more concerned about the individual interests within their states.	Further, precisely because the 




appealed to the interests of each state, they had to appeal to those interests rather than use reason 
to argue why a national government would best protect the good of the whole. This recognition 
by the founders, or more precisely the federalists, further explains why the rhetoric during the 
State Ratifying Conventions centered on interests. Rather than convincing the states why the 
Constitution would provide the best solution to protecting republican principles, they geared 
their arguments toward the interests of whichever state they were trying to persuade in order to 
prove that the Constitution balanced interests in such a way that would protect the good of that 
state. 	
 For example, as mentioned, Connecticut had struggled to pay back the war debt under the 
Articles of Confederation and was struggling economically.103 In order to highlight how the  
Constitution would address this particular interest, one federalist argued,  
[t]he weight of our [Connecticut] taxes cannot be shifted from our polls and our 
farms to foreign luxuries and the unnecessary goods of the merchants without 
vesting in Congress the power of laying imposts, duties, and excises. And I am 
glad to find such a provision in the Constitution…they know that the farmers are 
the support of every community, and particularly in this country. Accordingly, 
they have recommended such a form of government as is peculiarly favorable to 
the agricultural part of the United States.104  
 
Basically, he argued that the economic burden Connecticut had been bearing would be lifted 
because of the provisions giving Congress the power to lay imposts, duties, and excises on the 
agricultural goods that Connecticut produced. He further emphasized that not only do these 
provisions benefit Connecticut, but they demonstrate that the framers of the Constitution 
recognize the value of the farmers in Connecticut.  
 Another example in which the federalists appealed to state interests comes from Virginia. 
Edmond Randolph argued,  
“Paper money may…be an additional source of disputes. Rhode-Island has been 




defrauded their creditors by their paper money. Other States have also had 
emission of paper money, to the ruin of credit and commerce….The inhabitants of 
adjacent states would be affected by the depreciation of paper money…This 
danger is taken away by the present Constitution, as it provides, ‘That no States 
shall emit bills of credit.’”105 
 
Here, Randolph is suggesting that the Constitution provides a means to control the economic 
pitfalls that had been and would continue to affect Virginia and therefore it was in the economic 
interest of Virginia to adopt such a Constitution. While this argument along with the example 
from Connecticut only provide two pieces of evidence where the unique interests of a state were 
directly addressed to persuade ratification, this strategy was used over and over in a majority of 
the states that held significant opposition to ratification.106 In fact, the majority of arguments and 
the strongest arguments that the federalists made during the State Ratifying Conventions were 
demonstrating how the Constitution would benefit each state in particular, especially 
economically.107  
 Again, the federalists knew that the states were selfish	and	did	not,	therefore,	look	out	
for	the	common	good	of	all	states.	No one state would want to relinquish any sovereignty to a 
national government unless it was somehow in their interest, since they were not concerned with 
the interests or good of the other states or nation as a whole. So, as a means to an end, the 
federalists needed to use interests as a mechanism to get the Constitution ratified in order to 










































the rules of the game that the founders set up, analyzing the discourse that led to these final 
decisions helps us interpret whether or not we should continue following these rules. Hopefully, 
this essay opens the door to further analysis that gives us even more insight into the motives 
behind the details laid out in the Constitution. Under the current political climate and with the 
most recent presidential election, there has been an increased concern with how our government 
functions. By looking at the arguments that the founders made, we can better understand the 
logic behind their decisions, whether it is equal representation in the Senate, the function of the 
legislature in general, or how we elect the President. In doing so, we can come to our own 
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